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Abstract
Machine Learning models have been shown to
be vulnerable to adversarial examples, ie. the
manipulation of data by a attacker to defeat a
defender’s classifier at test time. We present a
novel probabilistic definition of adversarial exam-
ples in perfect or limited knowledge setting using
prior probability distributions on the defender’s
classifier. Using the asymptotic properties of the
logistic regression, we derive a closed-form ex-
pression of the intensity of any adversarial per-
turbation, in order to achieve a given expected
misclassification rate. This technique is relevant
in a threat model of known model specifications
and unknown training data. To our knowledge,
this is the first method that allows an attacker
to directly choose the probability of attack suc-
cess. We evaluate our approach on two real-world
datasets.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples theory is the study of the strategies
of a defender and an attacker in the following threat model:
an adversary has the ability of modifying an input, noted
x0 here, with the goal of crafting a new input xadv that will
be misclassified by the defender’s classification model. The
perturbation is noted δ0. Note that the attack happens at
test time. The attacker doesn’t have the ability to alter the
integrity of the model estimation.
xadv = x0 + δ0
With k known, untargeted adversarial examples crafting is
usually defined by the following optimization problem:
δ0 = arg min
δ
‖δ‖k s.t. fd(x0 + δ; θˆd) 6= y0
1Independent Researcher, Bordeaux, France. Correspondence
to: Martin Gubri <martingubri@free.fr>.
where fd : X × Θ → Y, x × θ 7→ y is the classifier (or
prediction function) of the defender’s model, θˆd is the de-
fender’s estimate of the model parameters, X the input
space, Y the output space, and Θ the parameters space. Note
that some authors prefer another definition for adversarial
examples (Biggio & Roli, 2017).
Some authors define the optimization problem by using
fd(x0; θˆd) instead of y0. We prefer to use y0, because if
the original input is already misclassified by the model, ie.
fd(x0; θˆd) 6= y0, then δ0 = 0p, with p the number of fea-
tures, if fd and θˆd are known. This point has consequences
in limited knowledge settings developed in part 4.
To this definition, the attacker may add application specific
constraints on δ. Various have been used in the literature:
• x0 + δ ∈ X , where X may be N
• ‖δ‖k < dmax (Biggio et al., 2013)
• ∀i, δi ≥ 0 (Grosse et al., 2017)
Similar conditions can be derived only on a subset of fea-
tures. For simplicity reasons, we will not use any of these
conditions in the following. We assume that X = Rp.
The attacker doesn’t necessary have the same knowledge
than the defender. Knowing the defender’s training data
and model specifications, the attacker can train an exact
copy of fd(·, θˆd). With partial knowledge of fd(·, θˆd), the
attacker can train a substitute model to craft adversarial
examples from it (Biggio et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2016a;
2017). Papernot et al. (2016b) build a typology of attacks
depending on the knowledge that the attacker have on the
defender’s model and on the goal of the attacker. Biggio et al.
(2013) detail the components of the attacker’s knowledge:
• the defender’s training data (completely or only a sub-
set)
• feature representation used by the defender
• the type of learning algorithm and the decision func-
tion, that we called model specification
• the defender’s estimate of the model parameters.
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The capability of the adversary may provide extra knowl-
edge on the defender’s model. The typical example is the
case of the attacker having feedback from the defender’s
model (Papernot et al., 2017).
The property of transferability of adversarial examples, de-
fined by the fact that some adversarial examples designed to
fool a specific model also fool other models, was observed
by Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2014), Papernot et al.
(2016a), Papernot et al. (2017), among others. Papernot et al.
(2016a) identify two types of transferability: intra-technique
transferability and cross-technique transferability.
The optimal L2-adversarial example for a logistic regres-
sion (with perfect knowledge) is the orthogonal projection
of the example onto the decision hyperplane (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016). In part 4, we use this technique
to compute adversarial example, but our method can be
applied to any adversarial example crafting technique.
The intuition guiding our work our work is that an optimal
adversarial example for the attacker surrogate model, given
the limited knowledge of the attacker, may not achieve
satisfactory intra-technique transferability. If the adversarial
example is very close to the decision hyperplane, a very
small difference between θˆd and θˆa can lead to failed attacks.
In part 2, we provide a probabilistic definition of an adversar-
ial example. In part 3, we recall the asymptotic properties of
the logistic regression. In part 4, we develop a closed-form
approximate of an adversarial example having a chosen ex-
pected successful attack rate, in the threat model of known
model specification but unknown training data for binary
classification by a logistic regression. In part 5, we apply
our method on 2 datasets.
Contributions
• We introduce a new probability-based definition of
adversarial example having an arbitrary expected mis-
classification rate using prior distributions to formalize
the attacker knowledge on the defender’s classifier.
• We make use of the asymptotic distribution of lo-
gistic regression parameters to derive a closed form
method to craft adversarial examples having a chosen
expected success attack rate, in a limited knowledge
threat model. To our knowledge, this is the first method
to allow an attacker to directly tune the probability of
attack success.
• We show that multiplying by the same scalar all adver-
sarial perturbations of the test samples computed on
the attacker’s surrogate model may not be effective to
improve intra-technique transferability.
• We observe the importance of knowing the estimation
method used by the defender, even for logistic regres-
sion.
• We notice that in our setting the choice of the L2-
regularization hyperparameter can be beneficial to the
attacker by reducing the variance of parameters esti-
mates.
2. Probabilistic definition of adversarial
example (α-adversarial example)
We define an α-adversarial example as an adversarial exam-
ple with an expected rate of successful attacks of α in an
perfect or imperfect knowledge setting:
min
δ
‖δ‖k s.t.
P
(
Fd(x0 + δ; θˆd) 6= y0
∣∣∣Fd ∼ DFd ∩ θˆd ∼ Dθˆd(Fd)) ≥ α
(1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is chosen by the attacker.
Fd is a random function drawn from the sample space
F ⊂ YX of the set of prediction functions that the de-
fender can use. DFd is the prior knowledge of the attacker
on feature representation, model type, its structural specifi-
cations (for example, the architecture of a Neural Network),
used by the defender. We consider X as the space of raw
data, and we include the data preprocessing step into Fd.
Dθˆd(Fd) captures the prior knowledge on the defender’s
estimates of parameters, training data, estimation methods,
regularization, hyperparameters of the model and of the fea-
ture representation. Then, Dθˆd(Fd) is the joined prior and
hyperprior of the parameters of Fd. The Data Generating
Process (DGP) Pθ(X,Y ) is parametrized by θ, the vector of
true model parameters and hyperparameters, and of feature
representation hyperparameters. The distribution of θˆd is
conditioned by Fd, because the model (hyper)parameters
may vary across model types.
We formalize the knowledge of the attacker using the joined
probability distribution of Fd and θˆd. If the attacker knows
perfectly the true defender’s decision function fd, then DFd
is a deterministic distribution and ∀f ∈ F , P (Fd = f) =
1fd(f). Instead the attacker may have only partial knowl-
edge on the attacker model. In practice, the attacker may
know the state-of-the-art models or the industry practices
on a given task. Then, the adversary may be able to draw a
probability distribution on a set of models used by the de-
fender. The attacker may also draw probability distributions
of hyperparameters depending on the method used by the
defender (random search, grid search, etc.).
The attacker might want to estimate DFd using fˆa his/her
estimate of fd and estimate Dθˆd(Fd) using (fˆa, θˆa). This
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remark makes particularly sense if the attacker has an oracle
access to the defender model.
3. Recalls of the asymptotic properties of the
logistic regression
The logistic regression can be seen as a Generalized Linear
Model (GLM) with Binomial distribution and a logit link1.
A GLM is defined by 3 components (Fox, 2016, p. 379):
1. A conditional distribution of the response variable Yi
given Xi, member of the exponential family distribu-
tion. Yi are independent.
2. A linear predictor, ηi = β0 + β1Xi,1 + β2Xi,2 + · · ·+
βpXi,p.
3. A smooth and invertible link function g(·), ηi = g(µi).
Note that the point 1. implies that a GLM is not only a
transformation of the classical linear model using a link
function. GLM doesn’t have the hypothesis of normality of
the residuals.
Then, the logistic regression is a special case of GLM with
Yi ∼ B(mi, pii) 2 and the logit function as link (which is
the canonical link of the Binomial distribution). Note that
mi is known, so it isn’t a parameter of the model.
The Maximum Likelihood Estimator βˆMLE is asymptotically
normally distributed (Ferguson, 1996, p. 121). It is asymp-
totically unbiased with an asymptotic variance-covariance
matrix equals to the inverse of the Fisher information matrix
(XᵀWX)−1 ,
with W a diagonal matrix of weights defined by W :=
diag {mipii(1− pii)} (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989, p. 119).
W can be estimated by Ŵ = diag {mipˆii(1− pˆii)}. Note
that the same asymptotic property holds when n is fixed and
m→∞.
The ridge estimator in logistic regression, noted βˆL2,λL2 , is
a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator. Therefore it is
asymptotically normal (Ferguson, 1996, p. 140), asymptoti-
cally biased and the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix
is given by (Le Cessie & van Houwelingen, 1992):
(XᵀWX + 2λL2Ip)
−1
XᵀWX (XᵀWX + 2λL2Ip)
−1
1The reader not familiar with the GLM theory can read McCul-
lagh and Nelder (1989), which is the main book of reference on
GLM but somewhat difficult, or Chapter 15 of Fox (2016) available
there.
2The logistic regression can also be defined with Yi following
a Bernoulli distribution. Then, ∀i ∈ [[1;n]],mi = 1.
Then, if n is large, we can use the following approximations
to estimate the variance-covariance matrices:
V̂ar
(
βˆMLE
)
=
(
XᵀŴX
)−1
V̂ar
(
βˆL2,λL2
)
=
(
XᵀŴX + 2λL2Ip
)−1
XᵀŴX(
XᵀŴX + 2λL2Ip
)−1
4. Approximation of α-adversarial examples
for the logistic regression
For convenience, in this section we define
x˜0 :=
(
1
x0
)
∈ Rp+1 and δ˜0 :=
(
0
δ0
)
∈ Rp+1.
We will consider the following threat model:
Perfect knowledge of fd
• The defender is using a logistic regression to perform
a binary classification task,
∀(x0, β) ∈ Rp×Rp+1, fd(x0, β) =
{
1 if x˜ᵀ0β > 0,
0 otherwise.
• The attacker knows perfectly the defender’s feature
representation.
Limited knowledge of θˆd
• The attacker doesn’t have access to the defender’s train-
ing data.
• The attacker has access to some surrogate training data
generated by the same Data Generating Process (DGP)
parametrized by β ∈ Rp+1.
• The attacker knows the specifications of the logistic re-
gression (regularization method and hyperparameters,
estimation method).
Therefore the defender’s parameters estimation βˆd is fixed
but unknown by the attacker. The attacker can compute βˆa
using his/her own data.
The goal of the attacker is to find δ∗ solving problem 2.
δ∗ = arg min
δ∈Rp
‖δ‖k s.t. P
[
fd(x0 + δ; βˆd) 6= y0
]
≥ α
(2)
where k ∈ {1, 2} and α ∈ [0, 1] are chosen by the attacker.
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For simplicity purposes, we consider the following subopti-
mal problem.
First step: The attacker compute an adversarial example
for his/her own model. Any adversarial example crafting
technique can be used.
δ0 = arg min
δ∈Rp
‖δ‖k s.t. fd(x0 + δ; βˆa) 6= y0
In the following, we consider the L2-optimal adversarial
example (k = 2) which is the orthogonal projection of x0 on
the decision hyperplane Ha = {x ∈ Rp | fd(x; βˆa) = 0}
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). The associated perturbation
can be computed by
δ0 = − x˜
ᵀ
0 βˆa
‖βˆa;-0‖22
βˆa;-0
where βˆa;-0 =
(
βˆa;1, βˆa;2, · · · , βˆa;p
)ᵀ
.
Second step: The attacker searches an optimal scalar λ∗,
the intensity of the adversarial perturbation δ0, needed to
achieve an expected misclassification rate on the defender’s
model of at least α:
λ∗ = arg min
λ∈R
‖λδ0‖k′ s.t. P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
≥ α
with k′ ∈ {1, 2}. It can be simplified as
λ∗ = arg min
λ∈R
λ2 s.t. P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
≥ α
(3)
We denote the α-adversarial example: x∗adv := x0 + λ
∗δ0.
Problem 3 can be rewritten as
min
λ∈R
g(λ) s.t. h(λ) ≥ 0
with g : R → R+, λ 7→ λ2 and h : R → [−1, 1],
λ 7→ P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
− α.
g and h are of class C1. Then using the complementary
slackness of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions, if λ∗ is
a local optimum, h(λ∗)g′(λ∗) = 0 . If h(λ∗) = 0 the
constraint is said to be saturated, and if g′(λ∗) = 0 it is not
saturated.
4.1. Case 1: Constraint saturated, ie.
P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
= α
For convenience, we define the random variable Z as follow:
∀λ ∈ R, Z := (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀβˆd
For large samples, βˆd  N
(
E(βˆd),Var(βˆd)
)
.
Then, Z  N (E(Z),Var(Z)) with
E(Z) = (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀE(βˆd),
Var(Z) = (x˜0 + λδ˜0)
ᵀVar(βˆd)(x˜0 + λδ˜0).
The attacker estimates E(βˆd) by βˆa, and Var(βˆd) by
V̂ar(βˆa) which is computed as explained in part 3.
4.1.1. SUBCASE A: y0 = 1
Using the quantile function of the normal distribution, if
y0 = 1:
P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
= α
⇔ P (Z ≤ 0) = α
⇔ (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀβˆd
+
√
(x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀVar(βˆd)(x˜0 + λδ˜0)
√
2 erf−1(2α− 1)
= 0 (4)
Equation 4 is estimated by the attacker by :
(x˜0 + λδ˜0)
ᵀβˆa
+
√
(x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀV̂ar(βˆa)(x˜0 + λδ˜0)
√
2 erf−1(2α− 1)
= 0
⇒
[
(x˜0 + λδ˜0)
ᵀβˆa
]2
− (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀV̂ar(βˆa)(x˜0 + λδ˜0)2
[
erf−1(2α− 1)]2
= 0
⇒ (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀβˆaβˆᵀa (x˜0 + λδ˜0)
− (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀV̂ar(βˆa)(x˜0 + λδ˜0)2
[
erf−1(2α− 1)]2
= 0
⇒ (x˜0 + λδ˜0)ᵀ
[
βˆaβˆ
ᵀ
a − 2
(
erf−1(2α− 1))2 V̂ar(βˆa)]
(x˜0 + λδ˜0) = 0
⇒ x˜ᵀ0Ax˜0 + λ(x˜ᵀ0Aδ˜0 + δ˜ᵀ0Ax˜0) + λ2δ˜ᵀ0Aδ˜0 = 0
with A := βˆaβˆᵀa − 2
(
erf−1(2α− 1))2 V̂ar(βˆa).
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Table 1. Classification accuracies for the 3 estimation methods
studied on the spam dataset.
ESTIMATION
METHOD
ACCURACY
IN-SAMPLE
ACCURACY
OUT-OF-SAMPLE
IRLS 93.11% 92.61%
UNREGULARIZED
LIBLINEAR
93.11% 92.75%
L2-REGULARIZED
LIBLINEAR
93.14% 92.75%
Then, λ ∈ R can be computed by solving a second degree
equation. If there are two solutions, we choose the one that
satisfy Equation 4. We denote the solution of the second
degree equation λα.
4.1.2. SUBCASE B: y0 = 0
P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
= α
⇔ P (Z ≤ 0) = 1− α
λα can be derived similarly to subcase a, replacing α by
1− α.
4.2. Case 2: Constraint not saturated, ie.
P
[
fd(x0 + λδ0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
> α
In this case, g′(λ∗) = 0. It immediately follows that λ∗ =
0.
If P
[
fd(x0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
> α, then 0 is the global minimum.
Otherwise and if λα exists, then λα is the global minimum,
because it is the unique point that saturates the constraint.
To sum up, the problem 3 can be solved by:
λ∗ =
{
0 if P
[
fd(x0; βˆd) 6= y0
]
> α,
λα otherwise.
5. Applications
We applied our analysis on 2 datasets: the UCI spambase
set and the dogs vs cats image set. These two datasets are
binary classification problems. The code is available for
reproducibility purpose on GitHub and Framagit.
5.1. Spambase Data Set
The UCI spam dataset is small enough to estimate the lo-
gistic regression using the Iteratively Reweighted Least
IRLS Unregularized liblinear L2-regularized liblinear
Estimation Method
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Figure 1. Violin plot of the intensities of perturbations in the test
set for α = 0.9. The figure is zoomed in for better visualization.
Squares (IRLS) estimation method, generally used for GLM,
provided by the statsmodels Python module. We also trained
an unregularized and a L2-regularized logistic regression us-
ing the Scikit-learn implementation and the liblinear solver.
The accuracies are pretty similar between estimation meth-
ods (Table 1). But the estimated variance-covariance ma-
trices are very different from the IRLS estimation and the
liblinear ones. It leads to very different intensities to achieve
the same misclassification level for some examples. In Table
2, we can observe very different values of λ∗ across the 3
estimation methods studied for a arbitrary example x0 in the
test set. This is mainly due to the high difference in the es-
timations of β41, because βˆ41;IRLS = −48.08, βˆ41;URLB =
−3.07 and V̂ar
(
βˆ41;IRLS
)
− V̂ar
(
βˆ41;URLB
)
= 1332.74
whereas the second biggest element-wise difference be-
tween the two covariance matrices in absolute value is
12.56. It emphasis the importance of knowing the estimation
method used by the defender.
Table 2 also reports the estimated probabilities of being a
spam by the attacker model for the intensified perturbations
of x0 across estimation methods. It insists on the fact that
we do not have to confound the estimated probability of an
adversarial example to be in a specific class by the attacker’s
surrogate model, and the probability α of being classified in
a specific class by the defender’s model.
Figure 2 represents the intensity of the adversarial orthogo-
nal perturbation against misclassification levels from 0 to 1
for the same arbitrary example x0. The intensity associated
to the IRLS estimation is higher than the other two for all
values of α higher than 0.5, and it explodes sooner when
α tends towards 1. Notice that the the intensities have dif-
ferent scale across examples. It confirm our intuition that
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Table 2. Predicted probabilities of being a spam by the attacker model of an arbitrary test examples x0, its original perturbation x0 + δ0,
and its intensified perturbation x0 + λ∗δ0, and values of the intensities λ∗, for the 3 estimation methods studied on the spam dataset. Note
that y0 = 1 and α = 0.95.
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES
AND INTENSITIES
IRLS UNREGULARIZED
LIBLINEAR
L2-REGULARIZED
LIBLINEAR
P(Y = 1|X = x0, βˆa) 99.999986% 99.999892% 99.999919%
P(Y = 1|X = x0 + δ0, βˆa) 49.999606% 49.999656% 49.999649%
P(Y = 1|X = x0 + λ∗δ0, βˆa) 1.687831e−74% 1.004755% 2.040357%
λ∗ 12.059536 1.333934 1.275921
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IRLS
Unregularized liblinear
L2-regularized liblinear
Figure 2. Intensities of perturbations versus misclassification levels
for the same example x0 than Table 2.
multiplying all examples by the same scalar in not the best
way to improve intra-technique transferability.
Figure 1 shows the box plots and the kernel density estima-
tions of the perturbation intensity in the test set for a fixed
misclassification level of 0.90 across the estimation methods.
The median of intensities computed on the unregularized
model is sightly greater than the one on the L2-regularized
model.
Figure 3 represents the evolution of the intensities of the ad-
versarial perturbations with respect to the L2-regularization
hyperparameter. The relation is not straightforward. A very
strong regularization is beneficial to the attacker, because
it leads to very small parameter variance, which at the end
implies smaller perturbations to achieve the same misclassi-
fication level. A very small values of regularization leads to
instability in the intensities, which is good for the defender.
Interestingly, when the regularization is strong enough to
lower the accuracy, it increases the intensity until saturation
of the constraint (λ∗ = 0). With this exception in mind,
we can globally said that if regularization leads to better
estimates in terms of MSE (Mansson & Shukur, 2011), it
is also beneficial to the attacker. Then, we make the hy-
pothesis that there is a trade-off in the defender’s choice
10 7 10 5 10 3 10 1 101 103 105 107
L2-Regularization Hyperparameter
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
Out-of-Sample Accuracy
Intensity of the pertubation ( )
Figure 3. Quantiles of the empirical distributions of the intensities
λ∗ in the test set and out-of-sample accuracy, versus values of
the L2-regularization hyperparameter λL2 (in log-scale). The red
lower bound represents the first decile, the red upper one the last
decile, and the red line the median.
of L2-regularization hyperparameter between performance
and security.
5.2. Dogs vs Cats Images
We also applied our results to the Dogs versus Cats images
dataset, available on Kaggle, which is composed of 25000
labeled images of cats and dogs.
We preprocess the images by normalizing the luminance
and resizing them to a squared shape of 64 by 64 pixels. The
low resolution is necessary for us, because the computation
of the variance-covariance matrix needs the inversion of a
p× p matrix. We preserve the aspect ratio by adding gray
bars as necessary to make them square. Even using 64 by 64
pixels images, the resulting 12288 features are too large for
the GLM estimation using IRLS. We only used the Scikit-
learn implementation of logistic regression. We trained a
L2-regularized logistic regression, using the SAG solver,
where the regularization hyperparameter is chosen by grid
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Table 3. Classification accuracies the logistic regression trained on
the dogs vs cats images.
ACCURACY
IN-SAMPLE 73.37%
OUT-OF-SAMPLE 58.07%
0.75 0.9 0.95
Misclassification level ( )
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Figure 4. Violin plot of the intensities of perturbations in the test
set for different levels of misclassification. The figure is zoomed
in for better visualization.
search of 100 values on 3-Fold Cross Validation.
The accuracy of our model is poor (Table 3), because the
data are not linearly separable. It clearly overfits our training
data.
We choose to perturb 2 squared images from the test set,
which are represented in Figure 5. Original and adversarial
images cannot be distinguish by the human eye. Image 1 is
correctly classified as a cat. The intensity of the perturbation
of this image is a increasing function of the misclassification
level (Figure 6a): as α increases, the associated adversar-
ial examples is further away from the decision hyperplane.
Image 2 is not correctly classified as a cat. Then, the per-
turbation intensity is negative and is a decreasing function
of the misclassification level: a stronger misclassification
implies to be further away from the decision boundary in
the same half-space where is the original example. As seen
in Figure 5b and 6b, the value of λ∗ associated to Image 2
for α = 0.75 is 0, because the probability that the original
example is misclassified is 0.88.
We computed the intensities associated to the misclassifica-
tion levels of 0.75, 0.9 and 0.95, for each test example. The
empirical distributions of λ∗ grouped by α are represented
as violin plots in Figure 4. The intensities are scattered,
because of the differences in scales of the initial perturba-
tions δ0, and the fact that the variance-covariance matrix
of β is higher in some directions of δ0 than others. More-
over, increasing the misclassification level seems to lead to
higher empirical variance of the intensities.
5.3. Conclusions, limitations and future work
In this paper, we show a simple way to craft an adversarial
example that achieves an expected misclassification rate in
the case of limited knowledge, in which the attacker knows
that the defender uses a logistic regression, but doesn’t know
the defender’s training data. We defined an adversarial ex-
ample having an expected misclassification rate of α by the
defender, as an α-adversarial example. Using 2 real-world
datasets, we show the importance to compute the intensity of
adversarial perturbations at the individual level: computing
an adversarial perturbation on the attacker surrogate model
and applying the same intensity across all perturbations is a
suboptimal strategy to achieve satisfactory intra-technique
transferability.
Our method can be used on any adversarial perturbation
technique that only uses the surrogate attacker model with-
out considering the defender’s model. But it is based on
the assumptions that (i) the attacker has a very large num-
ber of training examples, (ii) the defender has a very large
number of training data generated by the same DGP than
the defender’s data, and (iii) the specifications (optimization
method, regularization, hyperparameters, etc.) are known.
Moreover, to be computationally feasible, the number of
features p cannot be very large, because the computation of
the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters needs the
inversion of a p× p matrix.
Future research may be to:
• Extend our results to multinomial logistic regressions
• Add other penalization methods
• Use finite sample distributions to have a better estimate
of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters
when the number of training data is not large
• Solve optimally the optimization problem 2 to com-
pute δ∗ instead of the suboptimal solution λ∗
• Handle the additional constraints listed in section 1,
like x0 + δ ∈ X
• Extend our method to other models that have known
asymptotic or finite-sample parameters distributions
• Evaluate the cross-technique transferability of α-
adversarial examples
• Extend the method of α-adversarial examples to the
case of unknown model, unknown model specification
or unknown hyperparameters, but known distributions
of these elements.
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(a) Image 1 (b) Image 2
Figure 5. Original image, attacker’s L2-optimal adversarial image, adversarial images achieving misclassification levels of 0.75, 0.90 and
0.95, and their associated perturbations, for 2 images from the test set. Image 1 is correctly classified by our logistic regression and Image
2 is not. Perturbations are represented in absolute values and multiplied by 100.
(a) Test Image 1 (b) Test Image 2
Figure 6. Intensities of perturbations versus misclassification levels.
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